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One Nation under Trump: More Power to 
Him? 
Jessica Hernandez* 
This note examines the following question: to what extent has the 
Trump administration heralded an expansion of presidential 
trade powers with respect to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962? It proceeds by first providing an overview of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. It then looks at the Section 232 
investigations which (a) preceded Trump’s assumption of office 
and (b) resulted in presidential trade action. After reviewing the 
aforementioned investigations, this note examines the Section 
232 investigations initiated under the Trump administration. 
Attention is paid to how the Trump administration has defined 
‘national security’ more broadly. The implications of adopting 
an expanded understanding of ‘national security’ are examined 
at various points throughout this note, and the note advances the 
notion that the president’s authority under Section 232 warrants 
curtailment via congressional oversight. Alternatives to Section 
232 duties which the United States might consider in the future 
are also briefly examined. This note ultimately concludes that 
although the Trump administration is not heralding an 
expansion of presidential trade powers with respect to Section 
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the broad definition of 
‘national security’ adopted by it has resulted in the premature 
imposition of Section 232 duties. Such misuse heightens the risk 
that the international community will perceive the United States’ 
actions under Section 232 as having roots in protectionism as 
opposed to in national security concerns. 
 
 
 * Juris Doctorate Candidate 2020, University of Miami School of Law; Bachelor of Arts 
2014, University of Miami.  
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I. WHAT IS THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962? 
 
In the midst of the Cold War, President John F. Kennedy signed into 
law the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The act was intended to facilitate 
the use of trade agreements as a means to stimulate the United States’ 
economic growth, strengthen foreign relations, and prevent the spread of 
communism.1 Kennedy’s remarks upon signing the bill encapsulated 
these goals: 
This act recognizes, fully and completely, that we cannot 
protect our economy by stagnating behind tariff walls, 
but that the best protection possible is a mutual lowering 
of tariff barriers among friendly nations so that all may 
benefit from a free flow of goods. Increased economic 
activity resulting from increased trade will provide more 
job opportunities for our workers. . . . The results can 
 
1  Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87–794, § 102, 76 Stat. 872, 872 (1962). 
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bring a dynamic new era of growth. . . . A vital 
expanding economy in the free world is a strong counter 
to the threat of the world Communist movement. This 
act is, therefore, an important new weapon to advance 
the cause of freedom.2  
Although the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 granted the president 
temporary authority to make substantial tariff cuts, it also granted the 
chief of state the power to do the exact opposite.3 
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (“Section 232”) 
enables the president to enact measures—including, but not limited to, 
increasing tariffs—to adjust imports of articles deemed a threat to 
national security.4 For the president to take action under Section 232, the 
Secretary of Commerce must first conduct an investigation into the effect 
of a given good on national security.5 The investigation may be self-
initiated; alternatively, an interested party or the head of a department or 
agency may request an investigation.6 The Secretary of Commerce has 
270 days after the date on which the investigation commences to submit 
a report to the president on the findings.7 Only if the Secretary of 
Commerce concludes that an imported good threatens national security 
may the president act under Section 232. The Trade Expansion Act of 
1962 grants the president ninety days to decide upon a course of 
action8—and an additional fifteen days to implement it.9 
Since Donald Trump assumed the presidency, the Secretary of 
Commerce has initiated four Section 232 investigations.10 Although 
Trump is far from the first American president to impose Section 232 
duties, there are concerns that he wields tariffs in a “much more forceful 
and much more coordinated fashion” than any of his predecessors, 
blurring the lines separating trade policy from foreign policy in the 
 
2  Legislative Summary: International, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND 
MUSEUM, https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/legislative-
summary/international (last visited Jan. 5, 2019). 
3  See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c) (2012). 
4  See id. 
5  See id. § 1862(b). 
6  Id. § 1862(b)(1)(A).  
7  Id. § 1862(b)(3)(A). 
8  Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A). 
9  Id. § 1862(c)(1)(B). 
10 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45249, SECTION 232 INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW AND 
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4 (2019).  
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process.11 Thus, questions remain as to whether the Trump 
administration is heralding an expansion of presidential trade powers—as 
they relate to Section 232. Securing a definitive answer, however, is 
complicated by the fact that it is difficult to assess whether an 
administration is exceeding its bounds when limits are not clearly 
delineated; Section 232 does not define ‘national security,’ and the 
legislative history is bereft of “any meaningful discussion of the 
standard.”12  
Despite the lack of a clear definition or standard for national 
security, the text of Section 232 does present a number of factors to 
consider in appraising national security, and most of them fit into one of 
two classes: (1) variables pertaining to national defense and (2) variables 
connected to economic welfare. Assessing national security through the 
national defense lens requires that one look at factors such as:  
. . . domestic production needed for projected 
national defense requirements, the capacity of 
domestic industries to meet such requirements, existing 
and anticipated availabilities of the human resources, 
products, raw materials, and other supplies and services 
essential to the national defense, the requirements of 
growth of such industries and such supplies and services 
including the investment, exploration, and development 
necessary to assure such growth, and the importation of 
goods in terms of their quantities, availabilities, 
character, and use as those affect such industries and the 
capacity of the United States to meet national security 
requirements. . . .13 
 
By contrast, evaluating national security through the economic 
welfare lens necessitates looking at an entirely different set of variables, 
including “the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare 
 
11 Adam Taylor, No President Has Used Sanctions and Tariffs Quite Like Trump, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/08/29/no-
president-has-used-sanctions-tariffs-quite-like-trump/?utm_term=.3f3ac7163535. 
12 David Scott Nance & Jessica Wasserman, Regulation of Imports and Foreign 
Investment in the United States on National Security Grounds, 11 MICH. J. OF INT’L L. 
926, 935 (1990). 
13 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (2012).  
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of individual domestic industries; and any substantial unemployment, 
decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills or investment, or other 
serious effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic products 
by excessive imports.”14 
The relative importance of factors relating to national defense and 
those touching upon economic welfare is not addressed in Section 232. 
Nor does Section 232 state how many variables the Secretary of 
Commerce must identify as having been adversely affected by foreign 
imports before soundly opining that a national security threat exists. 
Additionally, the considerations presented in Section 232 are not 
comprehensive; the statute makes clear—via language such as “without 
excluding other relevant factors”—that the lists therein are merely 
illustrative.15 These gaps aid one in concluding that, notwithstanding 
Trump’s improper use of Section 232 from a historical perspective, 
Trump is technically acting within the letter of the law from a legal 
perspective. It is this argument which this note seeks to advance: first by 
detailing the actions of pre-Trump administrations, and then by looking 
at the Section 232 investigations initiated under the current chief of state. 
II. THE PRE-TRUMP ERA 
 
Twenty-six Section 232 investigations were conducted during the 
various pre-Trump administrations.16 Nine of them resulted in 
affirmative findings by the Department of Commerce.17 In only six did 
the acting president “impose[] a trade action.”18 Those six cases will be 
discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. 
A. The Petroleum Investigation of 1973 
In 1959, President Dwight Eisenhower implemented the Mandatory 
Oil Import Program (MOIP).19 This program created a quota system 
which disallowed the importation of oil in excess of nine percent of 
 
14 Id.  
15 Id. 
16 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 10, at 38–40.  
17 See id. 
18 Id. 
19 Oil Dependence and U.S. Foreign Policy: 1850–2017, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., 
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/oil-dependence-and-us-foreign-policy (last visited Oct. 25, 
2018). 
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domestic consumption.20 MOIP essentially constituted a response to 
concerning findings by the Department of Commerce regarding the fact 
that “although domestic demand [for oil] grew by 216.8% from 1954 to 
1958, domestic crude oil production rose only 5.8%.”21 Essentially, an 
excess supply of petroleum at the international level—coupled with low 
prices therein—had resulted in an increase in imports, and such an 
increase “threatened the capability of the domestic suppliers to meet the 
requirements of an expanding economy”22 by denying, or at the very 
least severely restricting, the ability of domestic producers to grow. The 
worry was that, in the event of an emergency, the United States “would 
be confronted with all of the liabilities inherent in a static . . . 
mobilization base, including the delays, waste and inefficiency that 
accompany efforts to [strengthen] any part of the mobilization base on a 
‘crash’ basis.”23  It was against the backdrop of MOIP’s eventual failure 
to correct for the “imbalance” between domestic production and 
petroleum imports24 that President Richard Nixon decided to initiate a 
Section 232 investigation and subsequently move away from the existing 
quota system in favor of a license fee system.25 
B. The Petroleum Investigation of 1975  
In 1973, Nixon lent his support to Israel during the Yom Kippur 
War.26 Angered by Nixon’s actions, OPEC’s Arab member states 
responded by enacting an embargo on petroleum exports against the 
United States and its allies, heralding the OPEC Crisis.27 At the time of 
the embargo, the United States’ economy relied on oil imports to meet 
thirty-seven percent of its domestic consumption needs.28 The embargo 
denied the United States approximately thirty-eight percent of its 
imports.29 In 1975, in the wake of the OPEC crisis, President Gerald Ford 
 
20 Id. 
21 Jeffrey P. Bialos, Oil Imports and National Security: The Legal and Policy 
Framework for Ensuring United States Access to Strategic Resources, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L 
BUS. L. 235, 244 (1990). 
22 Id. 
23 U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., OFFICE OF SEC’Y., Effects of Oil Imports on National 
Security, 44 Fed. Reg. 18818, 18819 (Mar. 29, 1979). 
24 Bialos, supra note 21, at 245 (explaining that “oil imports continued to grow and 
rose from 1.61 million bbl/d in 1960 to 6.03 million bbl/d in 1973”). 
25 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 10, at 38.  
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initiated a Section 232 investigation.30 The findings of the investigation 
revealed that the United States’ dependence on imported petroleum was 
increasing, and this reliance “threatened to impair the national security, 
foreign policy, military predominance, and economic welfare of the 
United States.”31 After the Secretary of Treasury determined that there 
existed a significant risk that another interruption like the OPEC Crisis 
would occur,32 Ford took action under Section 232.33 He accelerated 
increases in Nixon’s graduated license fees; introduced a new, 
supplemental fee to be levied against every barrel of imported oil; and 
reinstated certain tariffs lifted under Nixon.34     
C. The Petroleum Investigation of 1978  
The petroleum investigation of 1978—which concluded in 197935 
and confirmed the findings of the 1959 and 1975 studies36—prompted 
President Jimmy Carter to issue two proclamations. In April of 1979, 
Carter issued Proclamation 4655, temporarily suspending import fees 
and tariffs;37a shortage of petroleum in the international arena had driven 
up prices in the oil market, and the added costs occasioned by previous 
Section 232 tariffs made import fees “burdensome to the American 
public.”38 Additionally, in April of 1980, Carter issued Proclamation 
4744, announcing the Petroleum Import Adjustment Program (PIAP).39 
At the time of the program’s enactment, the United States was importing 
more than forty percent of its oil,40 and—by 1978—OPEC nations were 
supplying the country with eighty-three percent of all imported oil.41 The 
United States was “import[ing] and us[ing] more oil than all the other 
Western industrialized nations put together.”42 When viewed in light of 
 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 246–47. 
32 Id. at 247. 
33 Id. at 248. 
34 Id. 
35 U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., OFFICE OF SEC’Y., supra note 23, at 18818. 
36 See Proclamation No. 4744, 45 Fed. Reg. 22864 (Apr. 2, 1980). 
37 Proclamation No. 4655, 44 Fed. Reg. 21243 (Apr. 6, 1979). 
38 Id.  
39 Proclamation No. 4744, supra note 36. 
40 Conservation Fee on Oil Imports Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with 
Reporters, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/conservation-fee-oil-imports-remarks-and-
question-and-answer-session-with-reporters (last visited Oct. 25, 2018). 
41 U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., OFFICE OF SEC’Y., supra note 23, at 18819. 
42 THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, supra note 40.  
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the Section 232 findings discussed above, this excessive reliance on 
foreign suppliers of oil was deemed a national security threat. 
Interestingly, in June of 1980, Carter rescinded Proclamation 4744 after 
Congress terminated the PIAP.43 PIAP’s fatal flaw was its imposition of 
fees on domestic and imported petroleum alike; thus, it “could not 
[possibly] act as a disincentive to reduce imports.”44   
D. The Iranian Petroleum Investigation of 1979 
On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants attacked the American 
Embassy at Tehran, taking approximately sixty Americans hostage.45 
Within twenty-four hours, several Iranian authorities—including 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (who was acting as the de facto chief of 
state), “the Foreign Minister, the commander of the Revolutionary 
Guard, the public prosecutor, and the judiciary”—expressed their 
approval of the militants’ actions.46 The hostage situation prompted 
Carter to issue Proclamation 4702 on November 12, 1979, implementing 
an embargo on Iranian oil.47 The proclamation came on the heels of a 
memorandum from the Secretary of Treasury, in which the United 
States’ reliance on Iran for oil was deemed to constitute a threat to 
national security.48  
The 1979 oil embargo presents a case wherein the connection 
between imports and a threat to national security is clear: had the United 
States continued to import oil from Iran in the midst of the hostage crisis, 
it would have funded a government which had taken—and which 
persisted in taking—hostile action against it. Providing Iran with a 
stream of income via petroleum imports was inherently incompatible 
with the goal of sending a message—both to Iran and to the international 
community—that threatening the safety and wellbeing of the United 
States’ citizens was unacceptable.  
E. The Libyan Petroleum Investigation of 1982  
In March of 1982, President Ronald Reagan issued Proclamation 
4907, announcing the enactment of an embargo on petroleum from 
 
43 Proclamation No. 4766, 45 Fed. Reg. 41899 (June 19, 1980). 
44 Indep. Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614, 617 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980).  
45 Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 418, 427 (1980). 
46 Id. 
47 Proclamation No. 4702, 44 Fed. Reg. 65581 (Nov. 12, 1979). 
48 Id. 
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Libya.49 In his proclamation, Reagan explicitly stated that the “policy 
and action supported by revenues from the sale of oil imported into the 
United States [from Libya were] inimical to . . . national security.”50 The 
actions and policies referred to by Reagan likely included Libya’s overt 
support of terrorism,51 its alignment with Palestine in the territorial 
dispute between Israelis and Palestinians,52 and its tendency to render aid 
to governments or movements black-listed by Washington.53  
The relationship between petroleum imports and national security in 
this case is similar to that in the case of Iran: the president may have 
concluded that the United States would indirectly fund activities adverse 
to itself, its people, or its allies absent an embargo. Given that Libya was 
“widely perceived as the world’s strongest supporter of terrorism” during 
the 1980’s, that conclusion was not without merit.54 
F. The Metal-Cutting and Metal-Forming Machine Tools 
Investigation of 1983 
In 1983, representatives from the ferroalloy industry, the metal 
fastener industry, and the machine tool industry sought the 
implementation of favorable protective measures under Section 232; they 
claimed that the existence of their industries was integral to national 
security.55 The subsequent investigation revealed that the aforementioned 
industries indeed faced problems domestically.56 For instance, with 
respect to the metal fastener industry, the United States imported nearly 
“two-thirds of the nuts, bolts, and large screws needed to hold together 
virtually all types of military equipment” by 1982.57 Despite the 
foregoing, the Department of Commerce opined that such a situation did 
not indicate the presence of a national security threat.58 Rather, it argued 
that the following factors warranted examination: (i) whether the 
exporting countries were politically reliable, (ii) whether any shipping 
 
49 Proclamation No. 4907, 47 Fed. Reg. 10507 (Mar. 10, 1982). 
50 Id. 
51 See Lisa Anderson, Rogue Libya’s Long Road, 241 MIDDLE E. REP. 42, 43 (2006). 
52 Yahia H. Zoubir, Libya in US Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow?, 
23 THIRD WORLD Q. 31, 32 (2002). 
53 Id. 
54 Jonathan B. Schwartz, Dealing with a “Rogue State”: The Libya Precedent, 101 
AM. J. INT’L L. 553, 553 (2007). 
55 Aaron L. Friedberg, The Strategic Implications of Relative Economic Decline, 104 
POL. SCI. Q. 401, 418 (1989). 
56 See id. at 419. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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losses incurred would prove minimal, and (iii) whether, if the suppliers 
were unable to access necessary raw materials, said suppliers would be 
able to “obtain sufficient quantities of suitable-grade steel from the 
United States.”59 Answering these inquiries in the negative did not create 
a per se presumption of a national threat; rather, it indicated that there 
was a possibility that delays and shortages could ensue.60 Ultimately, 
after conducting its investigation, the Department of Commerce elected 
not to recommend that the president act pursuant to the powers granted 
under Section 232.61 Instead, Reagan utilized avenues unrelated to 
Section 232 to offer aid where proper. For instance, the Department of 
Commerce’s reports led to “a decision in 1984 to increase stockpiles of 
some ferroalloys.”62 Additionally—with regard to the machine tools 
industry—the Reagan administration sought Voluntary Restraint 
Agreements (beginning in 1986) with various suppliers.63   
III. KEY POINTS FROM PRE-TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 
INVESTIGATIONS   
Taking action under Section 232 has often been regarded as “the 
nuclear option in trade law.”64 Thus, this note proposes that the following 
factors deserve thoughtful consideration before resorting to Section 232 
tariffs: (a) whether there is a significantly contentious relationship with 
an exporting state, (b) whether, under a hypothetical deterioration in the 
working relationship between the importer and a given exporter, the 
former’s ability to securely procure the imported good elsewhere 
(including internally) would be significantly compromised, and (c) 
whether the circumstances are such that in the event of a national 
emergency, the state would not be able to adequately meet the needs of 






63 Id. at 419 n.66. 
64 Noah Glazier, Legal Framework and Economic Critique: Trump's Trade Authority 
and Policy. A Look at the Legality, Practicality, Probability, and Rationality of President 
Trump's Proposed Trade-Related Action, 14 S.C. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 27, 42 (2017) 
(quoting Doug Palmer & Matthew Nussbaum, Trump puts aluminum imports in ‘national 
security’ crosshairs, POLITICO (Apr. 26, 2017, 9:25 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/26/trump-aluminum-imports-trade-237665). 
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one’s understanding of why prior administrations imposed Section 232 
duties in the petroleum cases but not in the 1983 case.  
In the 1983 case, the main exporting countries included Japan, 
Taiwan, and India—none of which the United States had a significantly 
contentious relationship with at the time.65 Moreover, states like Iran and 
Libya differed from Japan, Taiwan, and India in a fundamental way. 
Unlike the latter, the former had taken actions diametrically opposed to 
significant interests of the United States shortly before the imposition of 
duties, and they formed part of an organization that controlled a 
substantial amount of the international oil supply.66 Concerns that one 
OPEC member’s decision to stop supplying the United States could set 
off a domino effect were likely far from non-issues, and given the 
inability of the United States’ domestic industries to compensate for 
supply disruptions, the threat of a domino effect would have qualified as 
a compelling one. By contrast, during the 1983 Section 232 
investigation, the United States presumably determined either that its 
domestic industries would successfully mobilize and make up for any 
supply disruptions or that other suppliers could reliably fulfill this 
objective. 
IV. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION  
Having examined several Section 232 investigations initiated during 
pre-Trump administrations, one should next consider investigations 
commenced under the Trump administration. 
 
65 See Lou Cannon, Reagan, Nakasone Discuss Trade in Tokyo, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 
1983), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/11/10/reagan-nakasone-
discuss-trade-in-tokyo/5ea4a87f-a634-4f99-991c-2edbda7cdf80/ (making reference to the 
“friendly relations between Japan and the United States”); WHITE HOUSE, OFF. PRESS 
SECRETARY, Joint Communique of the United States of America and The Peoples 
Republic of China, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Aug. 17, 1982), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B00551R000200010003-
4.pdf (highlighting the United States’ commitment to maintaining “cultural, commercial, 
and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan,” and acknowledging that the 
United States had sold arms to Taiwan and would continue to do so); U.S.-India 
Relations 1947–2019, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-india-
relations (last visited Dec. 13, 2019) (identifying the year 1982 as a watershed in U.S.-
Indian relations, for President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Indira Ghandi agreed 
to “increase cooperation and resolve a dispute over nuclear power”). 
66 John Tagliabue, OPEC Talks Expected to Focus on Production, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
21, 1983), https://www.nytimes.com/1983/01/21/business/opec-talks-expected-to-focus-
on-production.html (identifying Iran and Libya as OPEC members in 1983).  
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A. The Steel Investigation of 2017 
In March of 2018, President Donald Trump issued Proclamation 
9705, announcing the imposition of a “25 percent ad valorem tariff on 
steel articles . . . imported from all countries except Canada and 
Mexico.”67 Trump’s decision to take action against steel imports under 
Section 232 is significant. It marked the first time in nearly thirty-five 
years that presidential action (in the form of imposing a tariff, duty, or 
fee) was taken under Section 232.68 Also, the decision marked the first 
time that action was taken under Section 232 against an import other than 
petroleum.69 As per Trump, the duties were enacted in response to a 
national security threat occasioned by a weakening of the country’s 
internal economy (precipitated, in turn, by “global excess capacity for 
producing steel”) and a “shrinking of [the United States’] ability to meet 
national security production requirements in a national emergency.”70 
Thus, put more concisely, Trump credited national defense needs and the 
county’s economic wellbeing with motivating his decision to impose 
duties under Section 232. 
Viewed in the context of the six Section 232 investigations discussed 
in the preceding sections, though, how appropriate is it to maintain that 
steel imports pose a national security threat? In answering this question, 
it is helpful to employ the three-pronged test proposed earlier; said test 
synthesizes multiple salient factors explicitly and implicitly considered 
by previous administrations. 
The first factor to consider is whether there exists a significantly 
contentious relationship with an exporting state. In descending order, the 
top twenty countries from which the United States imports steel are 
Canada, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Japan, Germany, 
Taiwan, India, China, Vietnam, the Netherlands, Italy, Thailand, Spain, 
the United Kingdom, South Africa, Sweden, and the United Arab 
Emirates.71 None of these countries recently engaged in openly hostile 
action—comparable in gravity, for instance, to Iran taking American 
 
67 Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11625, 11626 (Mar. 8, 2018). 
68 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 10, at 39–40. 
69 See id. at 38–40. 
70 Proclamation No. 9705, supra note 67. 
71 The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Security: An Investigation Conducted 
Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, As Amended, BUREAU OF INDUS. 
AND SEC. OFF. OF TECH. EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COM. (Jan. 11, 2018), at 28, 
https://agoa.info/images/documents/15373/theeffectofimportsofsteelonthenationalsecurity
-withredactions-20180111.pdf. 
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hostages in 1979 or to Libya’s government openly sponsoring terrorism 
in the 1980s—against the interests of the United States. 
Second, one must determine whether the deterioration in the working 
relationship between the United States and a given exporter would 
significantly compromise the former’s ability to securely procure the 
imported good elsewhere (including internally). Because the United 
States imports steel from such a long list of countries, and because the 
lower eighteen of these countries collectively supply approximately two-
thirds of the United States’ total steel imports (with no state individually 
supplying more than ten percent of said total),72 it is unlikely that a 
breakdown in one working relationship will significantly compromise 
other relationships—especially given the fact that steel-producing states 
are not members to an organization akin to OPEC, wherein the threat of a 
domino effect looms heavily.     
Lastly, it is necessary to assess whether circumstances are such that, 
in the event of a national emergency requiring mobilization of the 
military, the United States would not be able to adequately meet the 
needs of the Defense Department. Domestic production more than 
adequately meets the steel requirements of the United States military.73 
Such steel requirements “represent about three percent of U.S. 
production,”74 meaning that the United States produces enough steel to 
meet the military’s needs thirty times over. Furthermore, the United 
States has reciprocal defense arrangements—which afford it protection 
both in the event of an attack abroad and in the event of an attack on its 
own soil—with four of its top ten suppliers: Canada (via the North 
Atlantic Treaty), Brazil (via the Rio Treaty), Turkey (via the North 
Atlantic Treaty), and Germany (via the North Atlantic Treaty).75 
Collectively, these four states provide the United States with thirty-nine 
percent of its imported steel.76 Thus, if—in an emergency occasioned by 
an attack—the United States required a continued supply of steel to meet 
 
72 See id. 
73 See John Brinkley, Trump’s National Security Tariffs Have Nothing To Do With 




75 See U.S. Collective Defense Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://2009-
2017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/ 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20190805151941/https://2009-
2017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/] (last visited Aug. 24, 2019). 
76 See OFF. OF TECH. EVALUATION, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COM., supra note 71. 
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actual threats, the United States might be able to utilize its agreements 
with these countries to its advantage. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that—despite claims to the 
contrary—the circumstances do not warrant a finding that steel imports 
threaten national security by infringing on the United States’ ability to 
meet national defense needs. The next question to address is whether 
steel imports threaten national security by adversely affecting the United 
States’ economic wellbeing.  
Interestingly, some facts highlighted in the Department of 
Commerce’s investigative report include the following: in the 
international arena, no country imports more steel than the United States; 
the United States imports almost four times as much steel as it exports; 
since 1998, there has been a thirty-five percent decrease in domestic 
employment in the steel industry; since 2009, the domestic steel industry 
has operated on a negative net income; since 2010, the United States has 
charged more for hot-rolled steel coil—a common type of steel that often 
has its price regarded as a “benchmark price indicator”—than other states 
have; since 2000, four electric arc furnace facilities shuttered up, while 
more than twenty-five percent of the United States’ basic oxygen furnace 
facilities have been lost; and American steel producers have found that 
they are unable to compete with foreign producers.77    
Although it has been gradually increasing, the import penetration of 
steel is at a mere 33.8%—meaning that the United States produces nearly 
seventy percent of the steel it consumes.78 How is one to reconcile the 
assertion that importing 33.8% of consumed steel threatens the internal 
economy with the 1983 finding that importing nearly twice as many 
“nuts, bolts, and large screws needed to hold together virtually all types 
of military equipment” does not?79 Moreover, a substantial increase in 
jobs is unlikely to result from the imposed tariffs. One major reason why 
jobs in domestic steel production have declined is attributable to 
advances in productivity.80 Whereas it took 10.1 hours to produce a 
single ton of steel in 1980, it required 2.0 hours to accomplish the same 
feat in 2016.81 
 
77 Id. at 31. 
78 Id. at 7. 
79 Friedberg, supra note 55. 
80 See Tori K. Whiting, President Should Reject Flawed Commerce Report on Steel 
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Admittedly, it is concerning that the domestic steel industry is 
operating on a negative net income; this challenges its very viability.82 
Exacerbating such troubles is the fact that—reflecting “higher taxes, 
healthcare, environmental standards, and other regulatory measures,” as 
well as state-subsidization of steel production in other countries—the 
United States charges more for steel than other states do,83 and its steel 
producers continue to lose bids on domestic projects.84 Although 
resorting to Section 232 measures may seem like an ideal way to level 
the playing field and allow the United States’ steel industry to become 
competitive, Section 232 duties come with a hefty price tag. 
Overall, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is 
consistent with international obligations. In relevant part, Article XXI of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) reads as follows:  
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed . . . to prevent any 
contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for 
the protection of its essential security interests (i) relating to fissionable 
materials or the materials from which they are derived; (ii) relating to the 
traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in 
other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the 
purpose of supplying a military establishment; (iii) taken in time of war 
or other emergency in international relations . . .85   
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Trade Expansion Act provides 
fertile grounds for retaliation. For instance, a number of countries have 
responded to the United States’ Section 232 duties under Trump by 
increasing tariffs on American goods. Canada is doing so with steel and 
aluminum—among other products86—and the European Union has 
elected to place extra duties on goods to immediately rebalance €2.8 
billion worth of exports, with an additional €3.6 billion worth of exports 
 
82 See OFF. OF TECH. EVALUATION, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COM., supra note 71, at 37. 
83 See id. at 31–32 (explaining that in 2016 China’s prices for hot-rolled coil were 
fourteen percent lower, those in ASEAN states were thirty-three percent lower, and those 
in North Europe were twenty-one percent lower). 
84 See id. at 36–37. 
85 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 4 U.S.T. 639, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194. 
86 John Brew ET AL., Latest U.S. Trade Actions/Tariffs and Other Countries Retaliatory 
Measures, CROWELL MORING (October 30, 2018), 
https://www.cmtradelaw.com/2018/10/latest-u-s-trade-actions-tariffs-and-other-
countries-retaliatory-measures/ (last updated Aug. 23, 2019). 
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set to be rebalanced over the next few years.87 Other countries which 
have retaliated with increased tariffs include Mexico, China, India, 
Japan, Russia, and Turkey.88 Their targeted products range from bourbon 
whiskey and powdered cheese89 to golf cars and motorcycles.90  
Interestingly, the current trade war is reminiscent of one which 
unfolded during the 1960s. After the Second World War, the United 
States transitioned to factory farming, enabling it to supply mass 
quantities of poultry not only to domestic consumers but abroad as 
well.91 Countries like France and Germany responded by placing tariffs 
on chicken imported from the United States.92 While this had the 
intended effect of reducing the amount of American chicken exports, it 
also led President Lyndon Johnson to respond with tariffs of his own: 
Johnson imposed duties at a rate of twenty-five percent on potato starch, 
dextrin, brandy, and light trucks—all of which the United States 
imported from Europe in large numbers.93 Thereafter, “Volkswagen 
AG’s pickup and van business collapsed in the United States, and 
demand for French brandy began to dry up.”94 
That the consequences of the Section 232 duties on steel will mirror 
those of the chicken tax—albeit in reverse, with the United States’ 
businesses crumbling abroad—is quite possible. Equally possible is the 
 
87 European Commission Press Release IP/18/4220, EU Adopts Rebalancing Measures 
in Reaction to U.S. Steel and Aluminium Tariffs (June 20, 2018). 
88 Brew ET AL., supra note 86. 
89 Retaliatory Measures on Goods Originating in the U.S., CROWELL MORING, 
https://www.crowell.com/files/Mexican-Retaliatory-measures-on-goods-originating-in-
the-US.pdf. (last visited Jan. 4, 2019). 
90 Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the 
Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of Concessions and Other 
Obligations Referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards, 





91 Bryce Hoffman, If You Aren’t Worried About a Trade War, You Don’t Know About 




93 See id. 
94 Id. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 159 
 
chance that trading partners will imitate Trump and attempt to block the 
United States’ market access by pointing to national security concerns.95 
The effects of Trump’s Section 232 duties will likely be felt 
domestically, too. Industries which use steel in manufacturing will have 
to contend with the increased prices. Executives in impacted industries 
will undoubtedly elect to pass these additional costs to consumers, who 
may then respond by lowering their demand for affected products.  
B. The Aluminum Investigation of 2017 
In March of 2018, Trump issued Proclamation 9704, introducing “a 
10 percent ad valorem tariff on aluminum articles . . . imported from all 
countries except Canada and Mexico.”96 Trump indicated that aluminum 
imports threatened national security by negatively impacting national 
defense and the state’s economic wellbeing.97   
Viewed against the backdrop of pre-Trump Section 232 
investigations, can it be argued that aluminum imports pose a national 
security threat, as far as national defense is concerned? Again, it is 
appropriate to look to the three-pronged test proposed earlier. 
To begin with, there is no significantly contentious relationship with 
an exporting state. In descending order, the top sixteen states from which 
the United States imports aluminum are Canada, Russia, United Arab 
Emirates, China, Bahrain, Argentina, South Africa, India, Qatar, 
Venezuela, Indonesia, Mexico, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil.98 
None of these countries have recently engaged in openly hostile action 
such that the United States would be rendering itself vulnerable—from a 
security standpoint—if it persisted in trading with them. 
Moreover, the deterioration in the working relationship between the 
United States and a given exporter would not significantly compromise 
the former’s ability to securely procure the imported good elsewhere. 
With the exception of Canada, no country provides the United States 
 
95 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10667, SECTION 232 OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 
1962 (Version 14, 2019). 
96 Proclamation No. 9704, 83 Fed. Reg. 11619, 11620 (Mar. 8, 2018).  
97 See id. 
98 See The Effect of Imports of Aluminum on the National Security: An Investigation 
Conducted Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended, OFF. OF 
TECH. EVALUATION, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, U.S. DEP’T OF COM. (Jan. 17, 
2018), at 66, 
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/the_effect_of_imports_of_aluminum_on_t
he_national_security_-_with_redactions_-_20180117.pdf. 
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with more than eleven percent of its total aluminum imports.99 Hence, it 
is unlikely that the severing of ties with any one state will significantly 
jeopardize the United States’ access to aluminum. 
Finally, present circumstances are such that in the event of a national 
emergency, the United States would be able to adequately meet the needs 
of the Defense Department. The import penetration of aluminum is 
ninety-one percent100—meaning that the United States only produces 
nine percent of the aluminum it consumes. However, as was true with 
steel, the United States’ military requirements necessitate an allocation of 
merely three percent of total domestic aluminum production to 
defense.101 Additionally, the United States has reciprocal defense 
agreements with Canada and Germany via the North Atlantic Treaty, and 
with Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela via the Rio Treaty.102 Combined, 
these states provide nearly fifty percent of the United States’ total 
imported aluminum.103 In the event of a crisis induced by an attack, the 
United States could conceivably exploit these agreements to address 
material aluminum shortages. 
The preceding paragraphs suggest that, had the current state of 
affairs been subjected to a purely pre-Trump-administration analysis, the 
government would not have concluded that aluminum imports threaten 
national defense. Communications at the federal level support this 
assertion. For instance, in a memorandum authored by Secretary of 
Defense James Mattis for Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, Mattis 
explained that the United States’ production capabilities adequately 
satisfied military requirements.104 The fact that Mattis nonetheless used 
his memorandum to declare that unfair trade practices involving steel and 
aluminum could threaten national security necessitates discussing the 
extent to which aluminum imports adversely affect the United States’ 
economic wellbeing. 
At first blush, the most compelling finding that aluminum imports 
threaten the country’s economic wellbeing concerns employment. 
Between 2013 and 2016, fifty-eight percent of jobs in the primary 
aluminum sector were lost “as several smelters were either permanently 
 
99 See id. 
100 Id. at 6. 
101 See Brinkley, supra note 73. 
102 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 75. 
103 See OFF. OF TECH. EVALUATION, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COM., supra note 98. 
104 Brinkley, supra note 73. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 161 
 
shut down or temporarily idled.”105 Disconcerting though this finding 
may seem, the described decline represents a loss of only 7,408 jobs, and 
several other aluminum sectors—including secondary 
production/alloying, sheet/plate/foil/extrusion/coatings, foundries, 
forgings, and metal service centers—seemingly made up for this 
diminution by making available thousands of new jobs, thereby resulting 
in an overall employment increase of three percent in the aluminum 
industry as a whole.106 Thus, contribution to the unemployment rate 
cannot, in and of itself, be cited as the reason that the loss of certain 
aluminum manufacturing jobs creates a national security threat. Rather, 
as Trump explained in Proclamation 9704, there is growing concern that 
the continued closure of aluminum production facilities will cause the 
United States to rely entirely on foreign powers to (a) meet existing 
needs and (b) respond to emergencies wherein an increase in the 
production of aluminum is required.107 Trump’s chosen remedy—Section 
232 duties—raises a number of issues. First, as was true of the Section 
232 duties imposed on steel, increasing tariffs on aluminum introduces 
the risk of retaliation by the United States’ trading partners. For reasons 
previously discussed in the context of the chicken tax, this might 
essentially culminate in the sacrificing of multiple industries to save 
merely one. Moreover, the Section 232 duties are unnecessary. As per 
Jeff Bialos—former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial 
Affairs—the idea that the United States would suddenly need to increase 
metal production to replace damaged tanks (and the like) is antiquated 
thinking.108 Although such concerns were valid during the times of the 
Second World War, today’s wars center on “qualitative superiority, not 
quantitative superiority.”109 Concurring that the need to increase steel and 
aluminum production during wartime is a nonissue, Andrew Hunter—
former chief of staff to Ash Carter, who served as Secretary of Defense 
from 2015 to 2017—explains that because the market for steel and 
aluminum is so robust, the Department of Defense’s supply of these 
goods is not vulnerable to disruptions.110  
 
105 OFF. OF TECH. EVALUATION, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
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C. The Vehicle and Automobile Parts Investigation of 2018 
In May of 2018, the Secretary of Commerce—acting under the 
direction of the Trump administration—launched a Section 232 
investigation into the effects of the importation of automobiles and 
automotive parts on national security.111  
According to the Congressional Research Service, the Trump 
administration initiated the vehicle and automobile parts investigation as 
part of its plan to institute changes not only in the auto industry but also 
in the domain of international trade.112 Namely, the administration aimed 
to accomplish the following: “(1) expand[] domestic auto manufacturing 
and domestic content in autos; (2) address[] bilateral trade deficits; and 
(3) reduc[e] disparities in U.S. and trading partner tariff rates.”113 Likely 
motivating the first of these goals was the fact that between 1992 and 
2018, the number of foreign-owned auto manufacturing plants located in 
the United States grew from seven to seventeen.114 Moreover, the number 
of imported vehicles—as a percentage of total sales in the United 
States—increased from forty-one percent in 2010 to forty-eight percent 
in 2017.115   
Furthermore, as far as the second goal of the Trump administration is 
concerned, some speculated that the threat of Section 232 duties was 
being used “to create U.S. leverage for ongoing and future negotiations” 
unrelated to automotive imports.116 For instance, in conjunction with 
talks concerning the proposed trade agreement between the United 
States, Mexico, and Canada, the Trump administration issued letters to 
Mexico and Canada wherein it expressed that both states would benefit 
from exemptions to any Section 232 duties relating to automobiles and 
automotive parts.117 Similarly, after the United States and Japan agreed to 
enter into trade negotiations, the Trump administration announced (in 
September of 2018) that it would not impose Section 232 duties on 
 
111 Notice of Request for Public Comments and Public Hearing on Section 232 National 
Security Investigation of Imports of Automobiles, Including Cars, SUVs, Vans and Light 
Truck, and Automotive Parts, 83 Fed. Reg. 24735–01 (May 30, 2018). 
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Japan.118 The United States made a comparable promise to the European 
Union as the two parties conducted trade negotiations.119 
Undoubtedly influencing the third of the administration’s goals was 
the understanding that—with respect to at least some vehicles—the 
United States imposes tariffs which are significantly lower than those of 
its trading partners.120 For instance, whereas the United States has a 2.5% 
tariff on passenger automobiles, the European Union has tariffs of ten 
percent.121 Overall, Trump wanted to address this incongruity by raising 
tariffs on all imported automobiles and automobile parts to twenty-five 
percent.122 
On May 17, 2019, Trump issued Proclamation 9888.123 In it, he 
stated that the Secretary of Commerce had concluded that (i) 
“automobiles and certain automobile parts [were] being imported into the 
United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to 
threaten to impair the national security of the United States,” (ii) imports 
[were] “weakening our internal economy,” and (iii) “[the] contraction of 
the American-owned automotive industry, if continued, [would] 
significantly impede the United States’ ability to develop technologically 
advanced products that are essential to our ability to maintain 
technological superiority to meet defense requirements and cost effective 
global power projection.”124 Rather than impose tariffs, however, Trump 
elected to direct the United States Trade Representative, Robert E. 
Lighthizer, to pursue agreements with the European Union, Japan, “and 
any other country the Trade Representative deem[ed] appropriate” to 
“address the threatened impairment of national security.”125 Lighthizer 
had to report back within 180 days.126 If the United States had not 
entered into an agreement within 180 days of Proclamation 9888’s 






122 See Peter Buxbaum, Section 232 Hearing on Automobile and Automotive Parts 
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was not carried out—the President could take other actions to adjust 
imports, including the imposition of tariffs.127 
On November 14, 2019, the 180-day period came to an end.128 
Because Trump had not imposed Section 232 tariffs by then, his ability 
to do so prospectively is now severely circumscribed.129 Had Trump 
elected to resort to sanctions, he would have faced an interesting 
predicament. To implement Section 232 duties without running afoul of 
international obligations, Trump would have had to show that the 
increasing of tariffs constituted an action which the United States opined 
necessary “for the protection of its essential security interests . . . relating 
to the traffic in . . .  implements of war” or “for the purpose of supplying 
a military establishment”; the other exceptions outlined in the GATT did 
not apply.130 Proclamation 9888, however, does not intimate that vehicle 
and automobile parts imports have had an adverse effect on the traffic of 
implements of war, nor did it suggest that they have interfered with the 
United States’ ability to supply its military. Rather, Proclamation 9888 
primarily focuses on the effects of such imports on research and 
development of key automotive technologies. 
D. The Uranium Ore and Products Investigation of 2018 
In January of 2018, Ur-Energy USA Inc. (“Ur-Energy”) and Energy 
Fuel Resources (USA) Inc. (“Energy Fuel Resources”)—two of five 
uranium miners in the United States—filed a petition requesting the 
initiation of a Section 232 investigation into the effects of uranium 
imports on national security.131 Petitioners sought to have twenty-five 
percent of the domestic market for uranium reserved for American 
companies.132 They framed their request as necessary for national 
 
127 See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(3)(A) (2012). 
128 David Lawder, Trump Can No Longer Impose ‘Section 232’ Auto Tariffs After 
Missing Deadline: Experts, REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2019, 2:39 A.M.), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-autos/trump-can-no-longer-impose-section-
232-auto-tariffs-after-missing-deadline-experts-idUSKBN1XT0TK. 
129 See id. 
130 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 85. 
131 Petition for Relief Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 from 
Imports of Uranium Products that Threaten National Security, Before the United States 
Department of Commerce (Jan. 16, 2018),  at 9, 17, http://www.energyfuels.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/2017.01.16-Signed-Petition.pdf. 
132 Steven Mufson, Trump Officials Weigh Limits on Uranium, Invoking National 
Security, WASH. POST (July 18, 2018), 
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defense purposes—and thus, national security purposes—claiming that 
the United States’ military requires uranium to build nuclear weapons, to 
fuel nuclear reactors, and to produce tritium.133 Petitioners further alleged 
that international treaties prevent the United States from procuring 
uranium from foreign parties for any of the aforementioned purposes.134 
Thus, the United States needs to maintain a degree of self-sufficiency 
where uranium production is concerned. 
Although petitioners refer to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, they seemingly fail to acknowledge the differences 
between the obligations imposed on nuclear-weapon states (“NWS”) and 
non-nuclear-weapon states (“NNWS”). With regard to NWS, the treaty 
provides as follows: 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty 
undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or 
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, 
or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or 
induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices.135 
 
Importantly, this article does not bar a NWS from transferring 
materials for use in nuclear weapons or devices. There is evidence in the 
remainder of the treaty’s text to suggest that this omission was made 
purposely. Had the authors of the treaty wanted to restrict NWS from 
trading in materials, they would have explicitly stated so, just as they did 
when addressing NNWS: 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty 
undertakes to accept safeguards . . . for the exclusive 
purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its 
obligations assumed under this Treaty . . . . Procedures 
for the safeguards required by this article shall be 
followed with respect to source or special fissionable 
 
133 Petition for Relief Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 from 
Imports of Uranium Products that Threaten National Security, supra note 131, at 76–78. 
134 Id. at 77. 
135 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. I, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 
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material . . . . The safeguards required by this article 
shall be applied to all source or special fissionable 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the 
territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried 
out under its control anywhere.136 
 
Because uranium is neither a weapon nor a device, NWSs are not 
precluded from transferring it. According to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, NWSs are those states which “manufactured and 
exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before 1 
January 1967.”137 Only five countries fall into this category: the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union (now the Russian 
Federation), France, and China.138 Thus—contrary to claims made by Ur-
Energy and Energy Fuel Resources—the United States is not limited to 
solely using domestically-produced uranium to meet its military needs. It 
can import uranium for military use from any NWS. 
Additionally, nuclear experts have determined that the United States’ 
military could rely on uranium stockpiles in the event of an 
emergency.139 The United States also has enough uranium to fuel its 
naval reactors through the year 2060, and—although the state previously 
predicted that it would exhaust the uranium set aside for tritium 
production by 2027—the Department of Energy has now identified 
actions which will enable tritium production to use existing reserves until 
sometime between 2038 and 2041 (or possibly later).140 As for the 
construction of nuclear weapons, because the United States is presently 
laboring towards reducing the number of nuclear warheads available 
globally, “there is little need for uranium imports for U.S. nuclear 
weapons.”141 
 
136 Id. at art. III (emphasis added). 
137 Non-Proliferation Treaty, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 
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In their petition, Ur-Energy and Energy Fuel Resources further argue 
that the domestic uranium mining industry must be properly maintained 
to ensure (a) that the United States does not become vulnerable to 
manipulation by states like Russia, which has a state-funded uranium 
mining industry and uses its nuclear capabilities to influence foreign 
policy, (b) that the United States preserves a sense of energy security and 
independence, and (c) that the United States sustains its research and 
development programs.142 Ultimately, the United States can rely on 
NNWSs to meet most—if not all—of its non-military needs. The United 
States currently obtains slightly over half of its total imported uranium 
from Australia and Canada.143 Although it cannot use this uranium to fuel 
nuclear reactors or build nuclear weapons, it can use such uranium to 
meet the fuel needs of its space fuel reactors, isotope production reactors, 
and research reactors. 
For the United States to retain the ability to satisfy its military needs 
without relying wholly on other NWS’s after it exhausts current reserves, 
it must ensure not only the continued existence of its uranium mining 
industry, but also that said industry remains in good health. Petitioners 
imply that the actions of other state actors are making this difficult. 
Because some countries—a number of which subsidize their uranium 
mining industries—are able to sell uranium at lower prices than the 
United States, the American uranium mining industry is becoming 
increasingly less competitive.144 Whether this amounts to a national 
security, however, is debatable.  
On April 14, 2019, the Secretary of Commerce transmitted to Trump 
his report on the investigation into the effects of uranium ore and 
products on the United States’ national security. The Secretary opined 
that “uranium is being imported into the United States in such quantities 
and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national 
security of the United States as defined under section 232 of the Act.”145 
However, Trump did not concur; he explained that although “the 
 
142 See Petition for Relief Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 from 
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Secretary’s findings raise significant concerns regarding the impact of 
uranium imports on the national security with respect to domestic mining 
. . . a fuller analysis of national security considerations with respect to the 
entire nuclear fuel supply chain is necessary at this time.”146 Thus, 
Trump elected not to impose Section 232 tariffs on uranium ore and 
products. 
V. PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS VERSUS THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION   
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 recognizes that national security is 
tied to both national defense and economic welfare. Nonetheless, in the 
Section 232 investigations that resulted in the undertaking of presidential 
trade action, pre-Trump administrations generally focused on matters 
pertaining to national defense in determining whether given imports 
posed a national security threat. They did not place economic 
considerations at the forefront of their discussions. The Trump 
administration, by contrast, seemingly places economic welfare on equal 
footing with national defense. Although doing so does not violate the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, it constitutes a shift away from the “very 
narrow, technical” reading of ‘national security’ which characterized 
previous Section 232 investigations.147 The succeeding considers whether 
such broadening poses a separation-of-powers problem. 
As was mentioned earlier, Section 232 duties are regarded as the 
nuclear option in the trade world.148 Comparing Section 232 tariffs to a 
nuclear weapon underscores the notion that implementing them is best 
left as a course of last resort. The manner in which the Trump 
administration broadly construes threats to national security, however, 
has seemingly resulted in the premature use of Section 232 duties. 
Because of the significant consequences attached to such tariffs, misuse 
is not to be taken lightly. Misuse raises concerns that the nation’s 
interests might be better served by placing limits on the president’s 
unilateral trade powers. Curtailment of this sort is not unprecedented. 
 
146  Id. 
147 See David Scott Nance & Jessica Wasserman, Regulation of Imports and Foreign 
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During the 1970s, the Nixon and Ford administrations initiated a 
system of price controls on petroleum in response to a sudden increase in 
fuel prices precipitated by OPEC.149 Although the controls kept the price 
of oil low in the United States and saved consumers between five and 
twelve billion dollars a year, they accomplished this at a great cost.150 
Because gas stations could not raise prices, global increases in oil prices 
led to reductions in the amount of foreign oil purchased by American 
companies.151 This caused a shortage of an estimated 1.4 million barrels 
of oil per day.152 Gas stations which previously remained perpetually 
open began closing mere hours after opening; a few hours was all that 
they needed to sell out of gas.153 The oil scarcity caused a panic and 
forced consumers to sit for hours in lines to ensure that they secured 
gas.154   
When the Iranian oil crisis unfolded in 1979, global oil prices 
skyrocketed, worsening the energy situation in the United States.155 
Fistfights broke out at gas stations shortly thereafter.156 Recognizing their 
unsustainable nature, Carter elected to phase out price controls between 
1979 and 1981.157 Opining that the significant increases in the price of oil 
(resulting from the ability of American companies to charge market 
prices) constituted “an appropriate object of taxation,”158 Congress 
passed the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act in 1980.  
Section 402 of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act (“Section 
402”) amended the Tax Expansion Act of 1962 by allowing Congress—
via a joint resolution—to render void any presidential action taken under 
Section 232 “to adjust imports of petroleum or petroleum products.”159 
Although the president may veto the resolution, a two-thirds vote by 
Congress can override the veto.160 A report authored by the staff of the 
Joint Committee on Taxation elucidates the possible rationale underlying 
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Section 402’s inclusion in the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Act. The report 
explains that, “[o]wing to the importance of all forms of energy to our 
economy, Congress believed that an orderly and specific procedure 
should be established for reviewing Presidential actions taken to adjust 
oil imports.”161 Additionally, Congress may have harbored concerns that 
subjecting domestic industries to excessive taxation could have adversely 
affected the economic welfare of the nation. If, for instance, owners of 
American gas stations had to contend not only with taxes attributable to 
the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act but also with tariffs imposed on 
the foreign oil they imported, it is quite feasible that gas station owners 
would have responded by simply raising their prices until “domestic [oil] 
prices [rose] even higher than the world price.”162 
Interestingly, the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act includes a 
phaseout provision.163 The Act stipulates the removal of the imposed 
taxes during a thirty-three month period beginning no later than 
December of 1990.164 Section 402, however, does not have an expiration 
date.165 It is still in effect. Bearing in mind that presidents imposed 
Section 232 duties exclusively on petroleum imports prior to the Trump 
administration—and assuming that Congress believed that presidents yet 
to come would continue to use Section 232 duties to adjust petroleum 
imports—to what extent can it be argued that a desire to restore its 
Article I powers motivated Congress to make Section 402 outlive the 
Crude Oil Windfall Profit Act? The Constitution grants Congress the 
authority to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” and the Trade 
Expansion Act undeniably infringes upon that right. Thus, it is 
conceivable that—in part—Congress intended to use Section 402 to 
curtail the president’s ability to act unilaterally in a domain wherein it 
typically received starring credit. Nevertheless, regardless of Congress’ 
aim, the effects of Section 402 are the same: the provision breathed 
congressional oversight into Section 232, and it aiding in partly restoring 
the balance of powers contemplated by the Constitution. With the Trump 
administration heralding the first-ever use of Section 232 duties to adjust 
imports of goods other than petroleum, perhaps the time has come to 
amend the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 yet again to extend 
congressional oversight to Section 232 duties levied against non-
petroleum goods.  
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During 2018, lawmakers introduced a number of bills to “take back” 
from the executive branch the power to regulate foreign commerce.166 
Senator Bob Corker notably proposed predicating the president’s ability 
to impose Section 232 duties on congressional approval.167 Overall, 
Corker’s bill has garnered the greatest support,168 and were it to pass, it 
would circumscribe the president’s trade powers more so than does 
Section 402; Corker’s bill would function as a complete prohibition 
absent an expressed green light from Congress.169 Because of the severe 
restrictions inherent in such a proposal, it is possible that the bill will fail 
to gain presidential favor—and given that Section 232 functions as a 
means of enhancing the country’s safety, executive disapproval of 
Corker’s bill would not come as a surprise.  
One might posit that increasing the likelihood of obtaining the 
president’s stamp of approval on legislation limiting the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 requires crafting a bill modeled after Section 402, 
which succeeded in passing muster with the legislative and executive 
branches—albeit under a different administration. Such a bill, however, 
would create the presumption that the imposition of Section 232 duties is 
valid unless Congress says otherwise. Bearing in mind the oftentimes 
adverse consequences associated with increasing duties, is it not 
preferable to have a statute which creates the opposite presumption: that 
the invocation of Section 232 duties is temporary unless Congress 
decides otherwise? A statute requiring approval of the president’s trade 
actions under Section 232 (within a given number of days of their 
undertaking, as opposed to prior to implementation as Corker suggests) 
would accomplish just that. More importantly, it would reinforce the 
constitutionally endowed hegemony of the legislative branch where 
regulating commerce with foreign nations is concerned. 
Ultimately, because the legality of Section 232 duties would lapse 
only if Congress failed to agree with the president’s trade actions, the 
hypothetical bill considered in this note would afford the president a 
considerable degree of latitude in taking swift action to address threats to 
national security. Hence, it might be perceived as a relatively fair means 
of reconciling Congress’ constitutional powers with the authority vested 
in the president by the legislature—similar to how the War Powers 
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Resolution of 1973 aided in reconciling Congress’ power to declare war 
with the president’s status as commander-in-chief.170  
VI. SECTION 232 DUTIES: “PLAN Z” 
Misusing or resorting to Section 232 duties prematurely can heighten 
the risk that the international community will perceive a given 
administration’s actions as having roots in protectionism as opposed to 
national security. This, in turn, might increase the likelihood that other 
countries will challenge the United States’ conduct in an international 
forum, or that the United States’ trading partners will retaliate. Hence, it 
is imperative that—whenever possible—administrations first attempt to 
remedy damages stemming from foreign imports by availing themselves 
of alternatives to Section 232 duties. 
One existing avenue is the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) 
dispute settlement mechanism. Amongst possible claims it could bring, 
the United States might benefit from alleging that certain WTO member 
states have violated Article VI of the GATT (which prohibits dumping) 
and Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (which disallows subsidies). The United States has made 
ample use of the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism in the past. Of the 
more than 577 disputes brought to the WTO since 1995,171 the United 
States has initiated 131 complaints.172 Admittedly, there is the possibility 
that challenging a state’s WTO compliance will occasionally prove 
fruitless. For instance, in 2017, the Obama administration requested to 
enter into consultations with China, claiming that the Chinese 
government provided subsidies to aluminum producers.173 One year 
later—merely two months before Trump announced the imposition of 
Section 232 duties on aluminum—consultations still had not occurred.174 
 
170 See 50 U.S.C. § 1544 (2012). 
171 Dispute Settlement Activity – Some Figures, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm#more_numbers (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2019). 
172 See Disputes by Member, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm (last visited Jan. 
7, 2019). 
173 China – Subsidies to Producers of Primary Aluminum, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds519_e.htm (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2019). 
174 2017 Report to Congress On China’s WTO Compliance, U.S. TRADE REP. (Jan. 
2018), 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 173 
 
It is thus not surprising why some think Trump is justified in taking 
action against aluminum imports under Section 232. Curiously, however, 
the United States did not request consultations with China to resolve the 
government’s alleged unfair trade practices as they relate to steel.175 This 
omission is relevant given that the Secretary of Commerce specifically 
identified China as one of the countries responsible for adversely 
affecting the United States’ steel industry.176 The fact that consultations 
to address the subsidization of Chinese aluminum failed to take place 
does not excuse the Trump administration for this lapse; to hold 
otherwise is to overlook the scores of times that the WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanism successfully resulted in or facilitated conflict 
resolution. Consequently, the United States’ decision to forego 
requesting consultations with China to challenge its trade practices 
concerning steel represents but one example of the Trump administration 
underutilizing the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism.177 
Instead of, or in addition to, pursuing existing alternatives to Section 
232 duties, the United States might consider reforming the international 
system. Specifically, the United States should push the WTO to adopt an 
anti-circumvention agreement; such an agreement would consist of rules 
prohibiting members from taking deliberate measures to illegally get 
around, or circumvent, antidumping and countervailing duties.  
Presently, the United States has “extensive antidumping and 
countervailing duties” on steel imported from China.178 However, in a 
number of cases, China has succeeded in avoiding these tariffs by 
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circumvention legislation, China’s actions do not fall within its scope.180 
To make an international agreement on anti-circumvention palatable to 
as many states as possible, its terms should be restricted to the most 
egregious instances of circumvention, such as when a state opens up 
shop abroad, or when goods are shipped to another country and sold 
from there without first undergoing substantial transformation in the 
second country. Overall, an international anti-circumvention agreement 
is desirable because there are circumstances under which not even 
Section 232 duties provide a sufficient remedy after a target state 
succeeds in avoiding anti-dumping and countervailing duties. The 
inadequacy of Section 232 tariffs in such instances is attributable to the 
fact that they are sometimes lower than the avoided anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties; for instance, whereas Trump has imposed a 
twenty-five percent duty on steel imported into the United States, the 
anti-dumping tariffs specific to China “often exceeded 200%.”181 
VII. CONCLUSION  
While pre-Trump administrations assessed national security under 
Section 232 primarily by looking at how given imports affected national 
defense, the Trump administration has elected to measure national 
security under Section 232 by gauging the impact of imports on both 
national defense and economic welfare. Notwithstanding this divergence, 
it is inaccurate to state that Trump’s decision to increase tariffs on steel 
and aluminum necessarily represents an expansion of presidential trade 
powers with respect to the Trade Expansion Act of 1962; Section 232 
allows for consideration of variables relating to both national defense 
and economic welfare in appraising national security. The broadening of 
how national security is conceptualized is thus problematic not because it 
risks violating domestic law, but because of how the international 
community might perceive unilateral trade actions taken in the name of 
eliminating that encompassed by a broader definition of ‘impairments to 
national security.’ When a president claims that he is increasing duties 
for purposes of addressing threats to the nation’s economic welfare, 
doubts arise as to whether national security or protectionism is the true 
motivator; arguably, it is considerably more difficult to differentiate 
between protectionism and a state’s genuine efforts to eliminate threats 
to economic welfare than it is to distinguish between protectionism and a 
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country’s sincere attempts to remove impediments to effective national 
defense. 
Overall, because of the great costs associated with the use of Section 
232 duties—namely in the form of retaliation—it is imperative that 
administrations treat these tariffs not as their Plan A but as their Plan Z. 
 
